Models, analysis, and recommendations pertaining to the retention of Naval Special Warfare's mid-level officers by Scott, Nathan A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2013-12
Models, analysis, and recommendations pertaining
to the retention of Naval Special Warfare's mid-level officers
Scott, Nathan A.
















Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
MODELS, ANALYSIS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
PERTAINING TO THE RETENTION OF NAVAL 








Thesis Advisor:  Michael Jaye 
Second Reader: George Lober 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
December 2013 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
MODELS, ANALYSIS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS PERTAINING TO THE 
RETENTION OF NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE’S MID-LEVEL OFFICERS 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S) Nathan A. Scott 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER   
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
  AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB protocol number ____NPS.2013.0080-IR-EP7-A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
Naval Special Warfare (NSW) is facing a substantial deficiency within its midgrade (8–15 years of active duty 
service) officer ranks. This thesis employs two different models in order to provide recommendations to the NSW 
Community Manager’s office for potential changes that might improve retention of these officers. The NSW 
Community Managers should use findings from the annualized-cost-of-leaving model to improve near-term retention, 
















14. SUBJECT TERMS Naval Special Warfare, NSW, retention, ACOL, financial, 
annualized, cost, leaving, analytical hierarchy process, AHP, model. SEAL. 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
101 

















NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
MODELS, ANALYSIS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS PERTAINING TO THE 
RETENTION OF NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE’S MID-LEVEL OFFICERS 
 
 
Nathan A. Scott 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 2002 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
























John Arquilla, PhD  
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis 
 
 iv 




Naval Special Warfare (NSW) is facing a substantial deficiency within its midgrade (8–
15 years of active duty service) officer ranks. This thesis employs two different models in 
order to provide recommendations to the NSW Community Manager’s office for 
potential changes that might improve retention of these officers. The NSW Community 
Managers should use findings from the annualized-cost-of-leaving model to improve 
near-term retention, and they should use recommendations from the analytical hierarchy 
process for improving long-term retention.  
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Losses within the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) 
pay grade are at near all-time highs for fiscal year (FY) 2013.1 The NSW Community 
Manager’s office, the Navy Personnel Research, Studies & Technology (NPRST) 
department, the Navy Financial Assistance Program (FAP) department, and the Naval 
Postgraduate School have conducted studies directed at gaining further insight into 
separation and retention within the NSW community.2 The NPRST department 
conducted analysis on factors influencing morale within the SEAL community;3 the 
Navy FAP department conducted phone interviews of separated NSW officers in order to 
gain insight into individual reasons for separating from the community;4 a master’s thesis 
researched civilian business retention methods in order to provide NSW with additional 
options it might use for increasing retention.5 As a result of these studies, the NSW 
Community Manager’s office is actively looking at ways to improve retention.6 
This thesis will analyze NSW’s officer retention issue from both a financial and a 
non-financial perspective in order to improve retention within the NSW community. 
Chapter II will draw a financial comparison between military and civilian competencies 
through use of the annualized-cost-of-leaving (ACOL) model. Chapter III will use a 
method known as the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) in order to investigate what the 
decision making process for a midgrade SEAL officer might look like when faced with 
choosing between a military or civilian profession by comparing both objective and 
                                                 
1 Observations made in conjunction with the office of the Naval Special Warfare Community 
Manager, October 25, 2013. 
2 Jeromy Williams and Darin Evenson, “NSW Officer Community,” NSW Officer Detailing and 
Community Management Brief, February 2013. 
3 Carol Newell, Kimberly Whittam, and Zannette Uriell, “2010 SEAL/SWCC/EOD/Divers Retention 
Quick Poll,” Navy Personnel Research, Studies, & Technology, 10 June 2010. 
4 Caren Canal Aruoba, Katie Bucklew, Rich Franks, Bill Gallagher, and Jeff Merkle, SEAL Officer 
Retention, Family Advocacy Program, 2012. 
5 Walter Allman, Jonathan Fussell, and Marty Timmons, “High Value Talent: Identifying, Developing, 
and Retaining Naval Special Warfare’s Best Leaders” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012). 
6 Observations made in conjunction with the office of the Naval Special Warfare Community 
Manager, October 25, 2013. 
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subjective criteria pertinent to each lifestyle. Chapter IV, the final chapter, will 
summarize data collected from both the ACOL and the AHP models in order to provide 
recommendations to the NSW community for improved near-term and long-term 
retention. 
A. SNAPSHOT: NSW GLOBAL COMMITMENTS SINCE 9/11 
NSW has been committed to combat operations in Afghanistan for more than 
twelve years; for nine of those years (2003–2011) NSW was also committed to combat 
operations in Iraq. Additionally, NSW has been involved with combined security efforts 
and host-nation building on a worldwide scale (Philippines,7 Africa,8 etc.).9 Over the last 
decade, through its worldwide involvements, NSW has developed, honed, and improved 
its operational capabilities; much of this experience resides within those SEAL operators 
serving from 2001 to the present. Unfortunately, though, “with the end to U.S. combat 
operations in Iraq and the drawdown for Afghanistan nearing, opportunities to forge an 
officer corps through actual combat experience are diminishing.”10 
B. A CALL FOR STRATEGIC PLANNERS 
In a speech given at the Naval Postgraduate School, General Charles Cleveland, 
Commander U.S. Army Special Operations Command, highlighted that U.S. Special 
Operations Force’s senior leaders are replete with tactical knowledge, but lack strategic 
planning abilities.11 Military strategic planning is cultivated from operational knowledge; 
operational knowledge builds upon tactical experience; tactical experience resides within 
those operators who have deployed in support of U.S. interests (Iraq, Afghanistan, 
                                                 
7 Bureau of Public Affairs, “U.S. Relations with the Philippines,” U.S. Department of State, September 
10, 2012, accessed September 25, 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2794.htm. 
8 Kathryn Whittenberger, “Naval Special Warfare Assists In Building Kenyan Special Boat Unit,” 
America’s Navy: Official Website of the United States Navy, June 10, 2010, accessed September 25, 2013, 
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=53967. 
9 Military.com, “Naval Special Warfare Command (NSW),” Military.com, 2013, accessed November 
29, 2013, http://www.military.com/special-operations/navy-special-warfare.html. 
10 Caren Canal Aruoba, Katie Bucklew, Rich Franks, Bill Gallagher, and Jeff Merkle, SEAL Officer 
Retention, Family Advocacy Program, 2012, 4. 
11 Charles T. Cleveland, “United States Army Special Operations Command,” Speech, Secretary of 
the Navy Guest Lecture Series at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 6, 2013. 
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Philippines, etc.). Therefore, if the U.S. military wants to improve its strategic planning, 
it must retain its operators with tactical experience. This is not to say that increased 
retention is the sole solution for improved strategic planning—one must certainly 
consider education and training as well—but it does suggest that strategic planning builds 
upon a cadre with strong tactical experience. Because much U.S. tactical experience 
gains have occurred over the past twelve years, retaining mid-grade NSW leaders (senior 
O-3’s to junior O-5’s) has become even more critical.  
C. IDENTIFYING THE MIDGRADE OFFICER RETENTION PROBLEM 
The current manning level for Lieutenant Commanders (LCDR or O-4) within 
NSW is 65.6% (see Figure 1).12 FY 2013 LCDR losses amounted to 12.28%, nearly 
equal to NSW’s historic high LCDR losses from FY 2011 (13.3%), and an increase from 
the 9.7 % LCDR losses for FY 2012.13 For three years in a row, NSW has lost, on 
average, more than 10% of its leaders at the LCDR pay grade—all voluntary 
separations.14 
                                                 
12 Jeromy Williams and Darin Evenson, “NSW Officer Community,” NSW Officer Detailing and 
Community Management Brief, February 2013. 
13 Jeromy Williams and Darin Evenson, “SEAL Officer (LCDR) Separations,” NSW Officer Detailing 
and Community Management Brief, February 2013. 
14 Observations made in conjunction with the office of the Naval Special Warfare Community 
Manager, October 25, 2013. 
 4 
 
Figure 1.  SEAL Officer Manning (from Williams and Evenson, 2013).15 
NSW currently has 736 authorized and funded officer billets. Of these 736 billets, 
NSW is only filling 591 (80%). NSW was also asked to grow its officer corps by 39% by 
the year 2015 (see APPENDIX A).16 NSW’s greatest shortfall comes within its LCDR 
pay grade, where it is billeted for 183 persons, but only fills 120 (65%). Additionally, 
NSW experienced its highest separation percentages within the O-4 pay grade during FY 
2011, 2012, and 2013 where it lost 13.3%, 9.7%, and 12.28% of its LCDRs, respectively 
(see Figure 2).17 One of NSW’s greatest challenges has become increasing its LCDR 
retention in order to fulfill existing and future billeting requirements. 
                                                 
15 Jeromy Williams and Darin Evenson, “NSW Officer Community,” NSW Officer Detailing and 
Community Management Brief, February 2013. 
16 Department of Defense, The 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Washington, DC: 2012 (Table 3–3. Special 
Operations Forces Staffing, Chapter 2, 42) 
17 Jeromy Williams and Darin Evenson, “SEAL Officer (LCDR) Separations” NSW Officer Detailing 
and Community Management Brief, February 2013. 
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Figure 2.  SEAL LCDR Loss Trend.18 
NSW experienced similar retention problems in the past when it implemented 
both an Officer Continuation Pay (OCP) aimed at retaining officers with 6–14 years of 
continuous service (implemented in 1999), and a Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) 
aimed at retaining officers with 15–25 years of continuous service (implemented in 
2007). OCP implementation (maximum of $15K per year) increased Lieutenant manning 
to its current level of 80.3% (from less than 55%),19 establishing a solid base from which 
to make LCDR and subsequently Commander (CDR) (68.8% manning) promotions. 
Currently, NSW’s biggest manning gap and largest retention issue is among those 
officers with 8–16 years of service.20 
Initiatives and recommendations for retention of NSW’s midgrade officers 
include the following: development of a mentorship program (currently in place), 
analyzing reasons for separation (currently in place), developing a predictable 
deployment schedule (future initiative), restructuring the targeted retention bonus (future 
                                                 
18 Jeromy Williams and Darin Evenson, “SEAL Officer (LCDR) Separations,” NSW Officer Detailing 
and Community Management Brief, February 2013. 
19 Jeromy Williams and Darin Evenson, “1130 By Grade,” NSW Officer Detailing and Community 
Management Brief, February 2013. 
20 Jeromy Williams and Darin Evenson, “NSW Officer Community,” NSW Officer Detailing and 
Community Management Brief, February 2013. 
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initiative), and reducing operational tempo (future initiative).21 Under current global 
commitments, developing a reliable deployment schedule and reducing operational tempo 
(two of NSW’s future initiatives) may be difficult. A restructure of the targeted retention 
bonus (NSW’s other future initiative), however, could be implemented with U.S. 
congressional approval, and would involve shifting the CSRB (maximum of $25K per 
year) from officers with 15–25 years of service to include those with 11–16 years of 
service. Based on past successes from bonus programs (OCP in 1999), this presents a 
viable option for NSW.22 
In “High Value Talent: Identifying, Developing, and Retaining Naval Special 
Warfare’s Best Leaders,” Allman, Fussell and Timmons researched financial and non-
financial incentives used by civilian businesses that might be used within NSW for 
incentivizing its high performers toward retention.23 This work, conducted by three 
midlevel NSW officers who graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in 2012, 
defined “high-performers” as those within NSW who: 
are recognized both inside and outside an organization as being highly 
competent professionally and managerially. These are individuals who 
typically deliver more than expected. A High Performer is often 
characterized as being motivated for the job and possessing professional 
pride, determination, and integrity.24 
This thesis uses the same definition for “high performers” in its analysis. In the “High 
Value Talent” thesis from 2012, some of the non-financial methods analyzed for 
improving the work-life relationship and retention of high performing SEAL officers 
included improving trust of senior leadership, flexible scheduling, work from home 
options, decreasing family moves, and allowing temporary sabbaticals. Among these 
non-financial methods, the “High Value Talent” thesis also mentioned six variations for 
                                                 
21 Jeromy Williams and Darin Evenson, “SEAL Officer (LCDR) Separations.” NSW Officer Detailing 
and Community Management Brief, February 2013. 
22 Jeromy Williams and Darin Evenson, “SEAL Officer (LCDR) Separations.” NSW Officer Detailing 
and Community Management Brief, February 2013. 
23 Walter Allman, Jonathan Fussell, and Marty Timmons, “High Value Talent: Identifying, 
Developing, and Retaining Naval Special Warfare’s Best Leaders” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2012). 
24 Allman, Fussell, Timmons, High Value Talent, 5. 
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financial retention, including pay for performance (not just rank), pay banding (dividing 
up performance groups and paying each group according to their performance), bonuses, 
stock options, retirement plans, and perks (vacations, etc.).25  
This thesis will not delve into details of implementing any of the aforementioned 
methods of retention. Instead, it will first compare and analyze financial compensation 
amounts for a SEAL officer and his civilian counterpart in order to show NSW how it 
might increase retention percentages through finances alone. This thesis will then show 
NSW where any non-financial retention efforts should be focused. 
D. COUNTER-THESIS: NSW IS HEALTHY AND MONEY SHOULD NOT 
MATTER 
Some might contend that NSW does not have a midgrade officer retention 
problem, stating that with historic growth rates of between 3–5%, NSW should meet total 
inventory demands by fiscal year 2018 or 2022.26 This argument is based on the idea that 
an increase in junior officers joining the community will eventually lead to enough 
officers promoting through the ranks to make the community whole. Doubters to any 
retention issues would also contest financial means for retention by arguing that SEALs 
motivated by money are staying in for the wrong reasons. 
E. REFUTATION: EXPERIENCE, PERFORMANCE, AND COST 
Whereas a non-military enterprise can assess talent from a pool of experienced 
talent, NSW cannot acquire new LCDRs with 8 or more years of experience. For 
example, should a civilian business recognize a need for an experienced accountant or 
program manager, it can solicit job application requests. This civilian business can then 
receive resumes from any number of accountants whom it deems qualified for the 
position, conduct interviews, and select an individual to fill the vacant position. NSW 
does not have this option. NSW cannot put out a job application notice for a SEAL 
LCDR with 8–10 years of combat experience because non-SEALs cannot fill SEAL 
                                                 
25 Allman, Fussell, Timmons, High Value Talent, 48–65. 
26 Jeromy Williams and Darin Evenson, “1130 Billets vs. Bodies.” NSW Officer Detailing and 
Community Management Brief, February 2013. 
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LCDR requirements. NSW can only draw from what it has grown. Therefore, every 
separated midgrade SEAL equates to a loss of a SEAL officer whom the community has 
spent 8+ years training and developing.  
Growth rates of 3–5% over the next five years (until 2018) may produce numbers 
and fill officer inventory demands (over all officer pay grades), but that projected rate 
does not account for the 10% in talent lost (for midgrade officers) every year until then.27 
Annual losses of 10% in the midgrade officer corps compared to 5% growth results in a 
net 5% loss every year. SEAL LCDR inventory within NSW illustrating an annual 5% 
growth gain, followed by an annual 10% loss due to separations, is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  SEAL LCDR Talent Lost Under Annual 5% Growth Gains Followed by 
Annual 10% Separation Losses. 
Closing the gap between inventory LCDR billets and authorized LCDR billets can 
only be accounted for by increased promotions from the junior officer base. As seen in 
Figure 3, as time progresses the gap between LCDRs on hand (inventory) and LCDR 
                                                 
27 Jeromy Williams and Darin Evenson, “SEAL Officer (LCDR) Separations,” NSW Officer Detailing 
and Community Management Brief, February 2013. 
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billets authorized will continue to widen. This gap represents lost experience and is 
representative of the retention problem within NSW’s LCDR pay grade. 
By the time a SEAL officer becomes a senior LCDR, more than $2 million dollars 
has been spent on his development.28 Those making the claim that NSW wants only the 
right type of person to stay in the community—and that the wrong type of person is the 
individual who claims monetary incentives as a reason for staying in NSW—should re-
assess their position: with more than 10 years of training invested in one of its SEAL 
leaders, would it not make sense for NSW to pay a person worth retaining an additional 
bonus each year, rather than accept talent loss and incur another $2 million dollar 
expense?29 
Improving retention involves both financial and non-financial incentives. In the 
next two sections, this thesis will analyze retention from both a financial perspective and 
a non-financial perspective. Next, this thesis will use the ACOL model to assess near-
term financial incentives through a comparison of the financial differences for a SEAL 
officer on active duty to his notional civilian counterpart.  
                                                 
28 Caren Canal Aruoba, Katie Bucklew, Rich Franks, Bill Gallagher, and Jeff Merkle, SEAL Officer 
Retention, Family Advocacy Program, 2012, 4. 
29 Caren Canal Aruoba, Katie Bucklew, Rich Franks, Bill Gallagher, and Jeff Merkle, SEAL Officer 
Retention, Family Advocacy Program, 2012, 4. 
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II. ANNUALIZED-COST-OF-LEAVING (ACOL) MODEL 
A model developed by Warner and Goldberg in 1984 sought to quantify a service 
member’s decision to remain in the military or separate from service. Known as the 
annualized-cost-of-leaving (ACOL) model, it is a mathematical comparison of the 
financial value of a continued military life to the individual versus the financial value of 
civilian life. The ACOL model was initially used in order to determine the effects of the 
selective reenlistment bonus (SRB) on the retention of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and 
Air Force enlisted personnel. Findings from research conducted in 2001 determined that 
increased SRB resulted in increased retention.30  
The ACOL model combines all elements of military pay (basic pay, basic 
allowance for housing (BAH), special pays, etc.) in its comparison to civilian 
equivalencies.  The ACOL model is a Gross comparison of the salary portion of an 
individual’s compensation package, and does not include monies associated with health 
care, retirement packages, stock options, etc.  An officer may implement the ACOL 
model when the decision to stay in or get out is at hand. It is summarized in Equation (1).  
 




where Mj is military pay (including any OCP) in year of service (YOS) j; t is the current 
YOS; s is the length of military career; Cj is the potential civilian pay in the same year j; 
and r is the current federal discount rate.31  
                                                 
30 Mathew S. Goldberg, A Survey of Enlisted Retention: Models and Findings (Alexandria, VA: The 
CNA Corporation, 2001), 61. 
31 Bankrate.com, “Federal Discount Rate,” Bankrate.com, July 31, 2013, accessed August 3, 2013, 
http://www.bankrate.com/rates/interest-rates/federal-discount-rate.aspx. 
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From Equation (1), a SEAL will remain in the military if the “MILITARY 
VALUE” on the left-hand side of the equation is greater than the “CIVILIAN VALUE” 
on the right-hand side of the equation. Similarly, Equation (1) may be rewritten in terms 





For the ACOL model nonmonetary factors may be expressed with monetary 
values (e.g., “I will remain in the military only if they pay me $1000 more per year than I 
could earn as a civilian”),32 and are combined and referred to as the “taste factor,” v. 
Changes in the value of v, and how it affects retention, will be explored in Section C of 
this chapter. 
The ACOL is represented as the annualized ratio between military and civilian 
pay at a time, s, in one’s career. Now, for purposes of Naval Special Warfare, the above 
equation presents three possibilities: (a) the maximum ACOLs value is greater than the 
taste factor, and the officer will remain in the military; (b) the maximum ACOLs value is 
less than the taste factor, and the officer will separate from the community; and (c) the  
 
 
                                                 
32 Mathew S. Goldberg, A Survey of Enlisted Retention: Models and Findings (Alexandria, VA: The 
CNA Corporation, 2001), 10. 
 13 
ACOLs value is equal to the taste factor, and the officer is undecided about separation 
and retention. This thesis will focus on the first two possibilities, summarized as follows: 
(a) Maxs {ACOLs} > v; the officer will remain in the military.  
(b) Maxs {ACOLs} < v; the officer will separate from the military. 
A. FIRST GLIMPSE AT THE ACOL MODEL–A SIMPLE HYPOTHETICAL 
EXAMPLE 
A simple hypothetical example for implementation of Equation (2) using values 
that compare a person in the military with a civilian counterpart who makes roughly the 
same annual compensation (Table 1) results in the ACOLs values found in Table 2. For 
demonstration purposes, Cj values from years 1–4 were $1000 less than their Mj 
counterpart, and Cj values for years 5–10 were $5000 more than their Mj counterparts. 
Table 2 is representative of the ACOLs values for each respective year of service, j, and 
Figure 4 is a graphical representation of the ACOLs values for this simple hypothetical 





Table 1.   Hypothetical Military and Civilian Compensation Values for Use in the ACOL Equation  
for j=10 Years of Service, and r = 0.75%. 
 
Table 2.   ACOLs Amounts From Values Found in Table 1. 
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Figure 4.  Hypothetical ACOL Chart for Cj Values Roughly Equivalent to Mj. 
Anytime the ACOLs value is greater than an individual’s taste factor, v, the 
officer will remain in the military. Conversely, when the individual’s taste factor exceeds 
the ACOLs value the officer will separate from the military. From our hypothetical values 
shown in Figure 4, this means that for any taste factor values (v) that fall above the 
charted line (or within the shaded grey area), the officer will separate from the military, 
and vice versa for any taste values falling below the charted line in Figure 4. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACOL MODEL 
Implementation of the ACOL model requires collecting military compensation 
values (base salary, basic allowance for housing,33 special pays, etc.) for each respective 
year of military service, s, for comparison to the closest corresponding yearly civilian 
                                                 
33 Department of Defense, “BAH Calculator,” Defense Travel Management Office: The DOD Center 
for Travel Excellence, January 22, 2013, accessed September 14, 2013, 
https://www.defensetravel.dod.mil/site/bahCalc.cfm. 
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compensation amounts.34 Table 3 is a summary of the annual compensation values for 
the 40–60th percentile civilians, 60–80th percentile civilians, 80–95th percentile 
civilians, the top 5th percentile civilians,35 and the SEAL officer. Values for each annual 
compensation amount are specific to the calendar year. All civilian values were obtained 
from the U.S. Census Bureau, and are current through September 2013.36 “SEAL 
Military Officer” values in Table 3 were calculated by adding base pay,37 basic 
allowance for subsistence,38 basic allowance for housing (an average of Norfolk and San 
Diego BAH rates - the two primary BAH reference cities for SEALs),39 special pay 
(Diving, Free Fall, Demolition),40 and the maximum OCP bonus amount allowed 
(starting at YOS 6, when OCP first becomes available) for each respective year.41 
Appendix B provides a summary of values used in calculating the annual “SEAL Military 
Officer” compensation amounts. All amounts are calculated as “Gross” in order to 
present a common ground for comparison between civilians and military personnel.42 
                                                 
34 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Table H-3. Mean Household Income Received by Each Fifth and 
Top 5 Percent,” U.S. Census Bureau, September 17, 2013, accessed September 14, 2013, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/index.html. 
35U.S. Department of Commerce, “Table H-3. Mean Household Income Received by Each Fifth and 
Top 5 Percent,” U.S. Census Bureau, September 17, 2013, accessed September 14, 2013, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/index.html. 
36U.S. Department of Commerce, “Table H-3. Mean Household Income Received by Each Fifth and 
Top 5 Percent,” U.S. Census Bureau, September 17, 2013, accessed September 14, 2013, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/index.html. 
37 About.Com, “FY 2001 Military Pay Charts,” U.S. Military, 2013, accessed September 14, 2013, 
http://usmilitary.about.com/library/milinfo/bl2001pay.htm (Same website was used for each respective 
year, 2001–2013) 
38 About.Com, “Basic Allowance For Subsistence,” U.S. Military, 2013, accessed September 14, 
2013, http://usmilitary.about.com/library/milinfo/blbas2001.htm (Same website was used for each 
respective year, 2001–1013) 
39 Department of Defense, “BAH Calculator,” Defense Travel Management Office: The DoD Center 
for Travel Excellence, January 22, 2013, accessed September 14, 2013, 
https://www.defensetravel.dod.mil/site/bahCalc.cfm. 
40 Military.Com Benefits, “Military Pay Overview,” Military Advantage, 2013, accessed September 
14, 2013, http://www.military.com/benefits/military-pay/special-pay. 
41 Military.Com Benefits, “Military Pay Overview,” Military Advantage, 2013, accessed September 
14, 2013, http://www.military.com/benefits/military-pay/special-pay. 
42 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Historical Changes of the Target Federal Funds and Discount 
Rates,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, February 22, 2010, accessed September 14, 2013, 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/statistics/dlyrates/fedrate.html (All rj values used for the ACOL model 





Table 3.   Civilian and Military Compensation Values by Year from 2001 to 2013. 
 18 
A graphical representation of values found in Table 3 may be seen in Figure 5. 
The “SEAL Military Officer” compensation line is representative of the annual 
compensation that a SEAL officer can expect over a 13-year career. Numbers within 
Table 3 and Figure 5 are inclusive of a 13-year career in order to represent midgrade 
SEAL Officers with 8–12 YOS, the most prevalent retention-problem time period for 
NSW.  
 
Figure 5.  Graphical Representation of Civilian and Military Compensation Values 
Found in Figure 5. 
For ACOL calculations the military pay value, Mj, will be compared to its nearest 
civilian compensation percentile competitor. This is to say that for the years 2001–2003 
military pay will be compared to the civilian 40–60th percentile; for years 2004–2009 
military pay will be compared to the civilian 60–80th percentile; for years 2010–2013  
 
 19 
military pay will be compared to the civilian 80–95th percentile. This year-by-year 
comparison will be conducted within the ACOL model in order to illustrate the effects of 
military promotions through the eyes of a SEAL officer as he compares himself to his 
nearest civilian competitor. 
C. DETERMINING THE TASTE FACTOR 
To implement the ACOL model one must next determine the applicable taste 
factor for a SEAL officer in 2010 (with 10 YOS). As mentioned earlier, the taste factor 
allows one to summarize nonmonetary factors for an individual faced with making a 
decision whether to separate or stay on active duty. Equation (3) is representative of the 
calculation necessary for determining the taste factor.  
 v = annual premium + above model prediction (3) 
The following statement is an example of the annual premium: “I will remain in 
the military only if they pay me $1000 more per year than I could earn as a civilian.”43 
The annual premium for this individual would be equal to $1000. Continuing with this 
example, suppose a SEAL requiring an additional $1000 annual premium also knows that 
his potential civilian earnings are $2000 above the model’s civilian compensation 
predictions. In this case, the above model prediction for the individual would be $2000. 
The taste factor for this person would be the sum of the annual premium and the above 
model prediction, or $3000. It is important to note that the taste factor could be negative 
if the annual premium or the above model prediction from Equation (3) summed to a 
negative value. If people prefer military life then the annual premium value will be 
negative. Similarly, if the potential civilian earnings were below the model’s civilian 
compensation predictions, then the above model prediction value would be negative. 
                                                 
43 Mathew S. Goldberg, A Survey of Enlisted Retention: Models and Findings (Alexandria, VA: The 
CNA Corporation, 2001), 10. 
 20 
Observations made from a survey of separated SEAL officers44 with an average 
of 8.9 years of service result in an average civilian earning potential for separated 
military officers of $173,222.45 
An executive placement firm (headhunter), with experience in placing military 
personnel, gathered data on ex-military officers with an average of 7.5 years of service. 
Observations made in conjunction with the executive placement firm result in an average 
civilian earning potential of $180,483 for separated military officers.46 
For this ACOL model, the civilian annual compensation equivalent for a SEAL 
officer with at least 7.5 years will be the mean of the Survey Average and Headhunter 
Average from above, or $176,852. This value represents the potential civilian pay portion 
of the above model prediction from Equation (3). Of note, values for civilian 
compensation have remained relatively steady from 2008–2013.47 Because the values 
have remained relatively steady, one can assume that values for 2013 are similar to those 
from 2008. Thus, civilian compensation values for 2013 are equal to civilian 
compensation values from 2012 for Table 3, Figure 5, and any subsequent ACOL 
analysis that will be performed later. 
Referring back to Table 3 and Figure 5, a SEAL officer’s annual compensation at 
the ten YOS mark is closest to the civilian 80–95th percentile average when compared to 
its next nearest competitor, the civilian 60–80th percentile. Because the SEAL officer’s 
annual compensation is most closely equal to the 80–95th percentile average, this value 
will be used for taste factor calculations. The civilian compensation prediction value for 
the civilian 80–95th percentile in 2010 was $169,391. The above model prediction for the 
                                                 
44 Institutional Review Board (IRB) restrictions for this thesis only allowed for nine individuals to be 
surveyed. IRB protocol number NPS.2013.0080-IR-EP7-A.  
45 Nathan Scott, Naval Special Warfare Officer Retention Survey (Monterey, CA: NPS, September 
2013), IRB Protocol Number NPS.2013.0080-IR-EP7-A, Survey Question: What is your current (or 
anticipated new job) annual monetary compensation (base pay plus total benefits package). 
46 Sarah Ashby, Background Summary of Military Personnel (San Francisco, CA: The Waterman 
Group, September 27, 2013). 
47 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Table H-3. Mean Household Income Received by Each Fifth and 
Top 5 Percent,” U.S. Census Bureau, September 17, 2013, accessed September 14, 2013, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/index.html. 
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SEAL LCDR, then, is the difference between the potential civilian pay ($176,852) and 
the civilian compensation prediction ($169,391), or $7,461. The taste factor equation, 
Equation (3), may now be rewritten as v = annual premium + $7,461. For a SEAL officer 
whose annual premium is $1000, the taste factor becomes v = $1000 + $7,461, or $8,461. 
We will use this taste factor value to demonstrate its role in the ACOL model. 
D. THE TASTE FACTOR AND ITS PLACE IN THE SEAL OFFICER ACOL 
MODELS 
Using the values from Table 3 and following the process used in the example 
from Section A of this chapter, we obtain the data displayed in Table 4 and 5. Figure 6 is 
an ACOL chart depicting a comparison of the SEAL officer’s compensation with his 





Table 4.   Military and Civilian 80–95th Percentile Compensation Values for Use in the ACOL Equation  
for j=13 Years of Service, and r = 0.75%. 
 
Table 5.   ACOLs Amounts From Values Found in Table 4. 
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Figure 6.  ACOL Chart for Cj Values Equal to the Civilian 80–95th Percentile  
for Years 10–13. 
Figure 6 shows that the ACOL value for the SEAL officer is increasing from 
years 1–9 before the steep decline seen from years 9–13. This is indicative of a growing 
cost for the SEAL officer to separate from the military, and is the case until a decision 
point highlighted between years nine and ten. It is between years nine and ten when the 
SEAL officer’s annual compensation is most closely linked to the civilian 80–95th 
percentile (as a result of promotions, YOS, bonuses, etc.). From our taste factor 
calculations in the previous section, the potential civilian pay at the ten YOS mark (2010) 
was $7,461 more than the 2010 civilian 80–95th percentile annual compensation value 




The SEAL officer contemplating separation from the military at ten years of 
service will have an $8,461 taste factor value from the previous section, which falls 
within the shaded area shown in Figure 7. This indicates that the SEAL officer would 
separate from the military.  
 
Figure 7.  ACOL Chart for Cj Values Equal to the Civilian 80–95th Percentile for Years 
10–13, With the Addition of Calculated Taste Factor, v. 
E. SENSITIVITY OF THE ACOL CHART 
This section will give the reader insight into the sensitivity of the ACOL model by 
showing the effects on the charted ACOLs line created by first altering civilian 
compensation values for years 10–13 (in comparison to current military compensation 
values), and next by increasing the Federal Discount Rate, r. Insight gathered from the 
sensitivity analysis will be used to provide potential financial fixes available to NSW that 
may rectify the separating officer whose taste factor falls within shaded “separate from 
military” portion of Figure 7. As a reminder, The ACOLs values shown in Figure 7 and 
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represented by the blue line were calculated using military pay amounts in comparison to 
each respective civilian compensation percentile. Using this method of comparison 
between military and civilian compensation values resulted in a steep decline starting at 
YOS nine and continuing through YOS 13. Figure 8 is representative of what the ACOLs 
line would look like if a SEAL officer continued to compare his salary after YOS 9 to the 
civilian 60–80th percentile, instead of the civilian 80–95th percentile used in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 8.  ACOLs Values When Military Compensation is Compared  
to Civilian 60–80th Percentile for YOS 10–13. 
Notice within Figure 8 that the ACOLs line increases as a function of time. In 
other words, the area below the ACOLs line (the red line from Figure 8) will continue to 
grow larger over time, and the value to the SEAL officer will be greater within the 
military than it will be within the civilian sector. Thus, if a SEAL were to compare 
himself to the civilian 60–80th percentile, then the SEAL officer would remain in the 
military. 
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Figure 9 is representative of what happens to the SEAL officer’s ACOL model 
when he is comparing himself to the civilian top 5th percentile for YOS 10–13. Instead of 
the positive slope in Figure 8, the ACOL for this comparison yields a steep negative 
slope. For a SEAL officer who is considering life as a civilian after YOS 9 and who 
believes he will be able to obtain a position as a civilian within the top 5th percentile, the 
cost of separating grows substantially smaller every year he remains in the military (from 







Table 6.   Military and Civilian Top 5th Percentile Compensation Values for Use  
in the ACOL Equation for j=13 Years of Service, and r = 0.75%. 
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Figure 9.  ACOLs Values When Military Compensation is Compared to Civilian Top 
5th Percentile for YOS 10–13. 
For the SEAL officer confronted with the ACOL calculations shown in Figure 9, 
the area above the ACOLs line (the green line from Figure 9) grows increasingly larger 
over time. In other words, this SEAL officer will likely separate from the military. 
Figure 10 summarizes ACOL calculations where military pay is kept constant, 
and its respective civilian pay competitor is varied. It is a graphical summary of ACOL 
calculations from Figure 7, Figure 8, and Figure 9. It is shown to demonstrate the 
sensitivity of the ACOL model to changes within the civilian compensation values.  
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Figure 10.  An Overlay Chart Comparing ACOLs Values for Military Pay Compared to 
Civilian Top 5th Percentile, Civilian 60–80th Percentile, and Civilian 80–
95th Percentile for YOS 10–13. 
Figure 11 presents the sensitivity of the ACOL model as it pertains to the Federal 
Discount Rate, r. The blue line seen in Figure 11 represents the current SEAL officer 
ACOLs line calculated using the current (November 2013) Federal Discount Rate, 
0.75%.48  The purple line in Figure 11 represents ACOLs when an increased Federal 
Discount Rate is used, in this case r = 5%—this might represent an unrealistic rate at 
present, but is used in this figure in order to demonstrate the effects of r on the ACOL 
model. The difference between the two ACOLs lines is slight, but shows that the 
increased r tends to “flatten” out the ACOLs line. That is to say that the positive slope 
from YOS 1–9 for r = 5% is less than the positive slope from YOS 1–9 for r = 0.75%; the 
negative slope from YOS 9–13 for r = 5% is less than the negative slope for YOS 9–13 
for r = 0.75%. In other words, an increase in the Federal Discount Rate will have only 
slight impact on ACOLs. 
                                                 
48 Bankrate, Federal Discount Rate, Bankrate.com, updated November 06, 2013, accessed November 
12, 2013. Website: http://www.bankrate.com/rates/interest-rates/federal-discount-rate.aspx. 
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Figure 11.  Effects of an Increased Federal Discount Rate on the ACOL Model. 
F. EFFECTS OF INCREASED MILITARY PAY ON THE ACOL MODEL 
The previous section analyzed the sensitivity of the ACOL model by taking a look 
at how changes in the civilian compensation values (Cj) and changes in the Federal 
Discount Rate affected ACOLs values. This section will investigate effects from 
increased military pay on ACOLs values.  
Figure 12 is representative of the effects of increased military pay on the ACOL 
model. As shown in Figure 12, the taste factor, v, falls above the ACOLs line created by 
comparing military pay with its respective closest civilian compensation competitor (blue 
line). As a reminder, civilian 80–95th percentile values for YOS 10–13 have been used in 
calculations because those values are closer to the SEAL officer pay for YOS 10–13 than 
the civilian 60–80th percentile pays for the same period, and because they are closest to 
the annual civilian compensation equivalent for a SEAL officer deciding between 
separation and retention. 
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Figure 12.  Taste Factor, v, with ACOLs Values for Current Military Pay and Military 
Pay With a $10K Increase Starting at YOS 10. 
The purple line in Figure 12 represents the change in the ACOL model for a 
SEAL officer if a $10K compensation increase is injected at YOS 10, 11, 12, and 13. 
Specifically, Figure 12 shows the effects of a $25K Critical Skills Retention Bonus 
(CSRB)—a $10K compensation increase over the $15K OCP bonus available to a SEAL 
officer for YOS 6–14—implemented at YOS 10. The $25K CSRB, the largest bonus the 
U.S. government currently authorizes for its military operators, is currently not offered to 
the SEAL officer until YOS 15.49 By increasing the SEAL officer pay for YOS 10–13, 
the taste factor now falls just above the new purple ACOLs line (ACOL10 = $8,460.79 
and v = $8,461). For a CSRB of $25K offered starting at YOS 10, the SEAL officer that 
is considering a life as a civilian still maintains a taste value that will separate from the 
military, though the values are very close.     
 
 
                                                 
49 Jeromy Williams and Darin Evenson, “Officer Incentives,” NSW Officer Detailing and Community 
Management Brief, February 2013. 
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Figure 13 shows the effects of a $25K CSRB implemented at YOS 9, represented 
by the purple curve. Notice that the taste factor now falls below the new purple ACOLs 
line (ACOL10 = $9,434.75 and v = $8,461). For a CSRB of $25K offered starting at YOS 
9, the SEAL officer that is considering a life as a civilian has a taste factor that will 
remain in the military.  
 
Figure 13.  Taste Factor, v, with ACOLs Values for Current Military Pay and Military 
Pay With a $10K Increase Starting at YOS 9. 
Figure 14 shows the effects of a $25K CSRB implemented at YOS 8 and is 
represented by the purple line. Figure 14 was created to demonstrate the effects, from a 
$10K increase implemented one year earlier than Figure 13, on the buffer between the 
taste factor and the new ACOLs line (the purple line). For Figure 13, the CSRB created a 
$973.75 buffer between retaining and separating. Now, with the CSRB implemented at 
YOS 8, the taste factor is $1,955 less than its respective ACOL10 value ($10,416.02). For 
a CSRB of $25K offered starting at YOS 8, the SEAL officer who is considering life as a 
civilian will remain in the military.  
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Figure 14.  Taste Factor, v, with ACOLs Values for Current Military Pay and Military 
Pay With a $10K Increase Starting at YOS 8. 
The decision is dependent on the value the SEAL officer places on his taste 
factor’s annual premium. Figure 14 is representative of the effect from increasing the 
buffer between the ACOLs line (purple) and the taste factor. If a SEAL officer has an 
annual premium of $3000 (resulting in a v = $10,461), vice the $1000 used for the taste 
factor in Figure 14, then his taste factor will continue to fall above the ACOLs line 
(compare with ACOL10 = $10,416 for the purple ACOLs line), and he will separate from 
the military. Keeping the taste factor under the ACOLs, line and within the “remain in 
military” area of the chart is accomplished by increasing the buffer between the ACOLs 
line—through increased pay earlier in the SEAL officer’s career.  
G. THE EFFECTS OF A LUMP SUM CSRB BONUS ON THE ACOL 
MODEL 
Lump sum bonus contracts aimed at improving retention have been used by NSW 
before. The OCP bonus was initially started in 1999 in order to retain junior officers 
within NSW,50 and was offered in one of two forms: (1) the individual could opt for 
                                                 
50 Jeromy Williams and Darin Evenson, “Officer Incentives,” NSW Officer Detailing and Community 
Management Brief, February 2013. 
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equal payment installments over the life of the contract (2) or the individual could opt for 
a 50% lump sum received for year one of the contract followed by equal payment 
installments of the remaining 50% for each year of the remaining life of the contract. 
Lump sum bonuses, vice equal payment installments, have been shown to improve 
retention efforts by 80%.51 Similar to the OCP bonus contracts, NSW also offers officers 
with 15–25 YOS a $25K per year CSRB. The SEAL officer can opt to receive the CSRB 
in the same forms as the junior officer was able to receive the OCP, via equal payment 
installments or via a lump sum payment option. 
The Naval Special Warfare Community Manager’s office is considering a 
restructure of the current Critical Skills Retention Bonus to include SEAL officers near 
10 YOS.52 The previous section showed the effects of the CSRB on the ACOL model if 
the member was paid $25K each year starting at YOS 10, 9, and 8. Figure 15 shows the 
effects of an eight-year CSRB bonus contract of $25K per year (totaling $200K) to the 
SEAL officer with a 50% lump sum ($100K) received for the first year of the contract at 
YOS 10, followed by seven equal installments of $14,285 paid out over the next seven 
years of the contract. 
                                                 
51 James Hosek and Christine Peterson, Reenlistment Bonuses and Retention Behavior (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 1985), 1. 
52 Observations made in conjunction with the office of the Naval Special Warfare Community 
Manager, October 25, 2013. 
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Figure 15.  Taste Factor, v, with ACOLs Values for Current Military Pay With a 50% 
Lump Sum CSRB at YOS 10. 
The Taste Factor in Figure 15 is now well below the ACOLs line residing within 
those taste factor values that will opt to remain in the military. A 50% lump sum bonus 
received at YOS 10 places the Taste Factor (v=$8,461) $7,250 below the ACOLs line at 
YOS 10. It also keeps the taste factor $1,639 under the ACOLs line for YOS 11. The 
monetary incentive depicted in Figure 15 presents a viable solution for the NSW 
community in improving retention of its midlevel officers beyond the critical ten-year 
decision point.  
H. ACOL CONCLUSIONS 
The costs of separating from active duty increase over YOS 1–9 for a SEAL 
officer. At YOS 10, however, the costs for separating from active duty begin to decrease 
as competing civilian compensation values begin to be markedly greater than the SEAL 
officer’s compensation. For a SEAL officer interested in separation, there exists a 
legitimate taste for entering the civilian market after YOS 9 as he nears the critical 
halfway point to military retirement. The potential for increased compensation within the 
civilian sector increases the taste factor for the SEAL officer while simultaneously 
decreasing the cost of separating from the NSW community. 
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The ACOL model is a good tool for use in determining near-term financial fixes 
for the NSW community because it presents a clear comparison between the SEAL 
officer’s pay and his perceived civilian counterpart. Based on the ACOL model, the right 
financial incentives made by the NSW community would have an immediate impact on 
improved retention. The ACOL examples in this chapter demonstrated viable near-term 
fixes for the retention of NSW’s midlevel officers.  
The ACOL model does not, however, address any systemic or long-term 
organizational concerns the NSW community might have. There may be issues affecting 
retention within the NSW community that cannot be fixed immediately. If these issues 
are non-monetary then the ACOL model cannot address them. For these non-monetary 
issues, another model will be required. The next chapter will introduce the analytical 
hierarchy process, a model that might be used by the NSW community for identifying 
any long-term concerns that might improve retention. 
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III. ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE: THE ANALYTICAL 
HIERARCHY PROCESS 
Every officer comes to a point in his/her career where two alternatives are 
present: (1) stay in, or (2) get out. Deciding between these two alternatives can be 
difficult, as there are generally several factors or criteria driving one’s decision toward 
either of the options. Some of these criteria may be objective in nature; some may be 
subjective. A process for weighing both objective variables such as pay, bonuses, etc., 
and non-financial or subjective variables such as time away from family, job satisfaction, 
etc., factors may provide insight into how NSW might best approach affecting the 
retention of its midgrade officers. 
One process for creating a way to make direct comparisons between variables 
with established, measureable properties and variables with no established scale of 
measurement is the analytical hierarchy process (AHP).53 AHP allows one to “express 
the intensity of people’s feelings with numbers,”54 by systematically evaluating the 
importance of each criterion as it relates to each of the other criterion. 
AHP involves five steps. First, one must identify the alternatives between which 
one is deciding. Second, one must identify and define the most applicable criterion under 
which the alternatives will be compared. Third, one must determine the criterion 
weights—accomplished by conducting a pair-wise comparison of each criterion’s 
importance in relation to the others. Fourth, one must build an eigenvector. Fifth, one 
uses the eigenvector to determine a final alternative ranking. The following sections will 
walk the reader through the five steps required when using the AHP.55  
                                                 
53 Thomas L. Saaty, “Relative Measurement and Its Generalization in Decision Making: Why 
Pairwise Comparisons are Central in Mathematics for the Measurement of Intangible Factors – The 
Analytic Hierarch/Network Process,” in Rev. R. Acad. Cien. Serie A. Mat (RACSAM), submitted by 
Francisco Javier Giron (Real Academia de Ciencias: Spain), 253. 
54 Saaty, “Relative Measurement,” 256. 
55 William Fox, “AHP Template Version 2_DA4410 Jan 2013,” Models of Conflict, Naval 
Postgraduate School: January 15, 2013. 
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In order to explore different parameters of the AHP model, two AHP examples 
will be examined. The first AHP example will be referred to as the “hypothetical AHP 
example,” and will guide one through the mechanics of how the analytical hierarchy 
process works. A separate AHP example will appear in the second half of this chapter for 
exploration of changes in criterion types and changes in criterion weights. This second 
AHP example will be referred to as the “adjusted AHP example,” and will analyze the 
effects of criterion changes on the overall AHP model.  
A. STEP ONE: IDENTIFY THE ALTERNATIVES 
For a first look at how the AHP model works we will start with the “hypothetical 
AHP example.” This example will use civilian compensation alternatives from the 
previous ACOL chapter for comparison to the military life. For this hypothetical AHP 
example an officer deciding whether or not to stay in or get out might be faced with three 
alternatives: (1) remain in the military (2) take on a civilian job comparable to the 60–
80th percentile of civilian wage earners, or (3) take on a civilian job comparable to the 
80–95th percentile of civilian wage earners. Recall that when faced with these three 
alternatives the SEAL officer opted to remain in the military when he compared himself 
to the civilian 60–80th percentile, and without any increase in military compensation he 
opted to separate from the military when he compared himself to the civilian 80–95th 
percentile.  
B. STEP TWO: IDENTIFY AND DEFINE THE CRITERIA 
For the objective and subjective criteria used in this hypothetical AHP example, 
the factors affecting the officer’s decision will be the following seven criteria: (1) level of 
risk to one’s life (2) annual compensation or salary (3) retirement benefits (4) time away 
for deployments (5) job satisfaction (6) health benefits (7) time away for training. A chart 







Table 7.   AHP Chart Depicting Hypothetical NSW Officer Alternatives and Criteria. 
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Note the differences in the units of measure for each criterion. Monetary units are 
used when comparing salaries, while a preferential—low, moderate, good—scale is used 
when comparing respective job satisfaction levels to the individual.  
As a control factor and in order to remain consistent with the previous chapter, 
annual compensation values for calendar year 2010 were used for comparison between 
the military officer with ten years of service, the civilian 60–80th percentile, and the 
civilian 80–95th percentile. A military officer with 10 YOS represents an officer that has 
reached the halfway point to military retirement, a decision point for the individual over 
which the government has the most influence. The criteria used for comparison of the 
three alternatives when determining what the “best” decision would be for a SEAL 
officer with ten years of service are defined as follows: 
1. Risk 
As a subjective measure of the physical and mental risk to one’s life, this criterion 
was used to compare the levels of risk associated with one who remains in the military 
versus one who opts to become a civilian.  Risk levels remain constant, regardless of 
marital status. For this hypothetical AHP example, risk was assumed to be greater for a 
SEAL on active duty when compared to his civilian counterpart, as a result of live-fire, 
free-fall, diving, etc.; for comparison within this hypothetical AHP example, a higher 
numerical score will be placed in conjunction with the civilian options when compared to 
the military because it will be assumed that a SEAL officer who is deciding between 
retention and separation values less physical risk, and, therefore, he views life as a 
civilian as better than life as an active duty SEAL. Values used for this comparison will 
be explained in a later section when conducting a pair-wise comparison within each 
criterion. 
2. Annual Compensation 
Annual compensation is an objective measure of compensation received for 
services rendered, and a higher compensation value is seen as better than a low 
compensation value for this hypothetical AHP example. In order to standardize this 
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hypothetical AHP example, data collected sought to compare a SEAL officer with 10 
YOS in 2010 to his civilian counterparts within the 60–80th percentile and 80–95th 
percentiles in 2010. From Table 7, values used for military compensation, the civilian 
60–80th percentile, and the civilian 80–95th percentile, were $128,275.00, $78,877.00, 
and $169,391.00 respectively. These are the same values used for calculations in the 
ACOL model for YOS 10. For this hypothetical AHP example, the highest compensation 
value ($169,391.00) will receive a higher numerical score when compared to the other 
two compensation values; the military compensation value ($128,275.00) will receive a 
higher score when compared to $78,877 and a lower score when compared with the 
$169,391.00. 
3. Retirement Benefits 
This criterion is subjective in nature, and seeks to compare retirement benefits 
received for a military officer (valued at the ten-year mark) opting to stay in for at least 
20 years, with his civilian counterpart’s retirement benefits. Military retirement benefits 
for this hypothetical AHP example include a guaranteed government pension of 50% of 
the average of the base pay for the last three years of service.56 Benefits received for the 
military person who retires at 20 years, then, are $4000/month (assumes estimates for a 
20 year Navy Commander upon retirement – base pay values are based on 2010 values), 
or $48K/year. The average civilian retirement income in 2010 was $30,158/year. For 
purposes of this hypothetical AHP example, the military retirement package is viewed as 
better than its civilian counterparts because the package includes a guaranteed pension, 
the individual is already halfway to retirement, and it is greater in value than its civilian 
competitor ($48K/year compared to $30,158/year). The civilian 80–95th percentile 
retirement package will be greater than the civilian 60–80th percentile retirement package 
because its annual compensation is greater, thus it is assumed that more money could be 
put into retirement savings. 
                                                 
56 Military.com Benefits, “The Military Retirement System,” Military.com, 2013, accessed November 
16, 2013, http://www.military.com/benefits/military-pay/the-military-retirement-system.html. 
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4. Time Away: Deployment 
This criterion sought to provide an objective look at the time spent away from 
home while on deployment. Similar to “Time Away: Training,” for this hypothetical 
AHP example more time away from home was looked upon as worse than less time away 
from home. The “Time Away: Deployments” column from Table 7 listed 90 days/year 
for the SEAL officer, and 0 days/year for each of the respective civilian competitors. 
SEAL officers deploy 6 months (180 days) over a 2-year cycle.57 90 days/year was 
calculated by dividing 180 days by the 2-year cycle (180 days/2 years = 90 days/year). 
For this hypothetical AHP model, because less time away from home is looked upon as 
better than more time away from home, 0 days/year will receive a higher score than the 
90 days/year. Values used for this comparison will be explained in a later section. 
5. Job Satisfaction 
A purely subjective criterion, for purposes of this hypothetical AHP example, 
defining job satisfaction takes into consideration the people one works with, the 
flexibility in one’s work schedule, and perhaps most importantly, the value one places in 
the type of work being conducted. For this hypothetical AHP example, which is taking 
into consideration an officer with ten years of service, we assume that some part of the 
type of military work for the SEAL officer has changed—at the 10 YOS mark he 
assumes a managerial role, thereby shooting less, free-falling less, and diving less—and 
he now occupies the role of a “desk job.” However, the SEAL officer who is considering 
life as a civilian also believes that his civilian job will likely also be that of a “desk 
job.”58 As to the quality of the people this SEAL officer works with, a statement from a 
participant from a recent survey may be summarized as, “I miss the quality of the 
people…you don’t realize how great the guys are until you are no longer around them.”59 
                                                 
57 Observations made in conjunction with a West Coast SEAL Team Operations Office, October 25, 
2013. 
58 Nathan Scott, Naval Special Warfare Officer Retention Survey (Monterey, CA: NPS, September 
2013), IRB Protocol Number NPS.2013.0080-IR-EP7-A, Survey Question: What type of work do you do 
(intend to do) now that you are no longer on active duty - Please answer any way you feel appropriate.  
59A Participant From a Resent Survey, Naval Special Warfare Officer Retention Survey (Monterey, 
CA: NPS, September 2013), IRB Protocol Number NPS.2013.0080-IR-EP7-A, Survey question: If there 
are any final comments you wish to add, please add them here.  
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For this hypothetical model, job satisfaction for the SEAL officer who remains in the 
military will be “good;” job satisfaction for the civilian 80–95th percentile, a “desk job” 
except without “the guys,” will be “moderate;” job satisfaction for the civilian 60–80th 
percentile will be “low.” When conducting the pair-wise comparison, “good” is better 
than “moderate,” and “moderate” is better than “low.”  
6. Health Benefits 
Without seeking to conduct an in-depth analysis of all the different types of 
medical and health benefits one can purchase for one’s family, this criterion seeks to 
provide an objective comparison between health benefit costs for the SEAL officer when 
compared to his civilian counterparts. For the military person remaining on active duty, 
the government provides full health care benefits at no additional cost to the individual. 
For each of the civilian alternatives, employer-sponsored civilian family health benefits 
for 2010 averaged $14,125 per year,60 an additional cost to the individual opting for 
civilian life. For this criterion, the zero cost, full-coverage, health care benefits received 
for military service is seen as better than the full-coverage, $14,125 per year, health care 
benefits for a civilian. Of particular note are upcoming changes within the health care 
system, when the Affordable Care Act goes into effect in January of 2014—new civilian 
health care costs for 2014 will be used in a later adjusted AHP model.61 The effect of 
these changes on AHP and retention could well be an interesting topic for future research. 
7. Time Away: Training 
This criterion sought to provide an objective look at the time spent away from 
home for purposes of job training. For purposes of this hypothetical AHP example, less 
time away from home is looked upon as better than more time away from home, because 
it assumes that a SEAL officer with 10 YOS has a preference toward time at home with 
his spouse and/or children when compared to deployment or other factors that increase 
                                                 
60 Pat Kelley, “The Average Health Insurance Cost,” eHow.com, 2013, accessed November 16, 2013, 
http://www.ehow.com/about_7275823_average-health-insurance-cost.html. 
61 The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, “Health Reform: Subsidy Calculator – Premium 
Assistance for Coverage in Exchanges,” Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013, accessed November 16, 2013, 
http://kff.org/interactive/subsidy-calculator/. 
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time away from home. The “Time Away: Training” column from Table 7 listed 104 
days/year for the SEAL officer,62 <27 days/year for the civilian 60–80th percentile, and 
27 days/year for the civilian 80–95th percentile.63 For this hypothetical AHP model, 
because less time away from home is looked upon as better than more time away from 
home, <27 days/year will receive a higher score than the other two, and 27 days/year will 
receive a higher score when compared to 104 days/year but a lower score when compared 
to <27 days/year. Values used for this comparison will be explained in a later section 
when conducting a pair-wise comparison within each criterion. 
C. STEP THREE: DETERMINING THE CRITERION WEIGHTS 
The AHP assists in making complex decisions even where subjective criteria are 
involved. For this example, the criteria have been ranked based on assumptions involving 
a military officer at the ten-year mark, with long-term goals in mind (annual 
compensation, retirement benefits, job satisfaction, etc.). This is the part of the example 
that can be tailored to specific individuals because one person might place job 
satisfaction as more of a priority than risk, etc. For this AHP model, here is the ranking of 
the criteria in order from “most important” to “least important”: Risk, Annual 
Compensation, Retirement Benefits, Time Away: Deployment, Job Satisfaction, Health 
Benefits, Time Away: Training. As such, applying subjective weighting to the criteria 
arrives at the pair-wise comparison matrix shown in Table 8. Comparisons in Table 8 
were done using the AHP model’s 1–9 scale, where 1 equates to “A is of equal 
importance to B,” and 9 equates to “A is of extreme importance when compared to B”—
meaning it is more important than B.64  
                                                 
62 Nathan Scott, Naval Special Warfare Officer Retention Survey (Monterey, CA: NPS, September 
2013), IRB Protocol Number NPS.2013.0080-IR-EP7-A, Survey Question: How many days per year (on 
average) did you spend away from home (for training or deployment) while on active duty within Naval 
Special Warfare? Training days were calculated using the survey average of 194 days/year, minus 90 
days/year for deployments (180 day deployment every 2 years). 
63 Nathan Scott, Naval Special Warfare Officer Retention Survey (Monterey, CA: NPS, September 
2013), IRB Protocol Number NPS.2013.0080-IR-EP7-A, Survey Question: How much travel is associated 
with your current (or proposed) position? 







Table 8.   Hypothetical AHP Example Pair-Wise Comparison of Criterion. 
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Table 8 is best read from left to right. Using “Risk” as an example of how to read 
the pair-wise comparison, one sees a numerical value of “1” placed at the intersection of 
the “Risk” row and the “Risk” column. A “1” from the pair-wise comparison scale (1–9) 
in this case means that “Risk” is of equal importance when compared to “Risk” (itself). 
At the intersection of the “Risk” row and the “Job Satisfaction” column one sees a 
numerical value of “5.” In this case a “5” is indicating that for this hypothetical AHP 
example of a SEAL officer’s opinions “Risk” is seen as more important than “Job 
Satisfaction” by a numerical value of “5” on the pair-wise comparison scale 1–9. The 
reciprocal of “5,” or 1 divided by 5 (1/5 = 0.2), is placed in the spot where the “Job 
Satisfaction” row intersects the “Risk” row in order to express the same level of 
importance when “Job Satisfaction” is compared to “Risk.” 
Each column is normalized in order to determine individual criterion weights. 
Normalization of Table 8 results in criterion weights for use in this hypothetical AHP 
example found within Table 9. 
 
Table 9.   Criterion Weights for the Hypothetical AHP Example. 
Table 9 represents a matrix that will be used in later calculations. From Table 9, 
one can see that “Risk” has the greatest value (0.3619471) compared to the other 
criterion. For this hypothetical AHP example, then, “Risk” holds the most importance. 
Each criterion now has a value for use in comparing one to another. It is important to note 
that it is within the criterion weights that one can figure out potential methods for 
influencing retention or separation of the military officer. For example, a military officer 
who places the highest criterion weight upon “Risk,” as has been done in this 
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hypothetical AHP example, might be influenced to separate or remain in the military by 
discussing other job alternatives that are higher or lower in risk (depending on the 
candidates desire in risk level). The sensitivity of values in Table 9 will be analyzed in a 
later section when an adjusted AHP example is implemented that uses different criteria 
with different criterion weights. 
D. STEP FOUR: BUILDING THE EIGENVECTOR 
An eigenvector is a special vector that, when multiplied by a matrix, is equal to a 
special constant times that special vector.65 This section will develop the eigenvector for 
use in multiplication with the matrix in Table 9. The eigenvector, as it applies to the AHP 
model, contains values within each of the criterion that, when multiplied by the original 
criterion weights, will provide the final overall ranking of the alternatives (remain in the 
military, or separate and take on one of the civilian alternatives). Building the eigenvector 
requires a pair-wise comparison and ranking of the three alternatives within each 
respective criterion. Tables 10–16 represent the pair-wise comparisons of each alternative 
within each criterion using the same 1–9 used for calculating the criterion weights. These 
tables may be read similar to the larger Table 8 matrix. Using the Table 11, “Alternatives 
versus Annual Compensation,” as an example, the numerical value of “3” found at the 
intersection of the “Civilian 80–95th Percentile” row and the “Remain in Military” 
column is indicating that where annual compensation is concerned, the Civilian 80–95th 





                                                 
65 Eigenvector (n.d.), Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition, Retrieved 
November 18, 2013, from Dictionary.com website: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Eigenvector. 
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Table 10.   Alternatives Versus Risk. 
 
Table 11.   Alternatives Versus Annual Compensation. 
 
Table 12.   Alternatives Versus Retirement Benefits. 
 
Table 13.   Alternatives Versus Time Away: Deployment. 
 
Table 14.   Alternatives Versus Job Satisfaction. 
 
Table 15.   Alternatives Versus Health Benefits. 
 
Table 16.   Alternatives Versus Time Away: Training. 
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Pair-wise comparison and rankings within each respective criterion provide the 
information necessary to compute the eigenvector for use in determining final decision 
values. It is important to note that it is within each of the above pair-wise criterion 
comparisons that subjective values might be altered in order to tailor the AHP model to 
specific individuals. For example, within the “Alternatives versus Risk” matrix a 
numerical value of “9” is at the intersection of the “Civilian 60–80th Percentile” row and 
the “Remain in Military” column. This numerical value of “9” may be altered to a “2,” 
depending on the individual’s view of “Risk” as it pertains to his future military position, 
thus altering the resulting eigenvector values. The above pair-wise comparison within 
each respective criterion creates the eigenvector values found in Table 17. Table 18 and 
19, on the other hand, are meant to demonstrate how the eigenvector values change when 
the pair-wise comparisons for “Risk” are changed from a numerical value of “9” to a 
numerical value of “2.” By comparing the two “Risk” columns from Table 17 and Table 




Table 17.   Eigenvector Values for Hypothetical AHP Example. 
 
Table 18.   Alternatives Versus Risk With a Numerical Value Change 
from “9” to “2.” 
 
Table 19.   Eigenvector Values After Numerical Value Changes in “Risk”  
from “9” to “2.” 
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Decreasing the pair-wise comparison value from “9” to “2” within the “Remain in 
Military” column from Figure 18 decreases the eigenvector values from 0.4736 in “Risk” 
column from Table 17 to 0.4 in the “Risk” column for Table 19. Recall from Table 10 
that the “Risk” pair-wise comparison values for the “Remain in Military” row were 
0.111. These values in Table 18 are now equal to “1” divided by “2,” or 0.5. Because 0.5 
is greater than 0.111 the eigenvector value for the “Remain in Military” row and “Risk” 
column in Table 19 is now greater than the equivalent eigenvector from Table 17 
(compare 0.05263 to 0.2). Thus, the numerical value changes from “9” to “2” in the 
“Remain in Military” row for the pair-wise comparison leads to an increase in the 
“Remain in Military” eigenvector value. 
E. STEP FIVE: FINAL HYPOTHETICAL ALTERNATIVE RANKING 
Multiplication of the resultant eigenvector values found in Table 17 with each of 
the respective criterion weights from Table 9 produces the vector of values depicted in 
Table 20. 
 
Table 20.   Final Values for Hypothetical AHP Example. 
It is at this stage within the Analytic Hierarchy Process that one assesses values 
produced for a complex decision involving multiple alternatives, each with multiple 
criteria, for use in making a final decision. In this case, since the resultant “Civilian 80–
95th Percentile” produces the highest final value, it is the best decision. Since the 
“Remain in Military” value is the next highest value, it is the second best decision. For 
this example, the “Civilian 60–80th Percentile” alternative has the lowest final value, 
making it the worst decision amongst the given alternatives. 
If the individual in this hypothetical AHP example views his next position within 
the military to have “Risk” values represented in Table 18 (remember, the changes from 
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“9” to “2”), and the military offered to increase his annual compensation (changes in 
pair-wise comparison shown in Table 21) in order to make it more competitive with the 
Civilian 80–95th Percentile (the current best decision), the resultant final values change 
to those seen within Table 22. 
 
Table 21.   Alternatives Versus Annual Compensation With Numerical Value Changes. 
 
Table 22.   Final Values for Hypothetical AHP Example After “Risk” and “Annual 
Compensation” Pair-Wise Comparison Changes (Lower Military Risk and 
Increased Military Compensation). 
Now, after decreasing the risk within the military officer’s next position and 
increasing his pay, final values between the three alternatives have changed. Since the 
final value for the “Remain in Military” alternative is now the greatest value, the best 
decision for this individual is to remain in the military. 
F. AHP SENSITIVITY: MODEL CHANGES TO REFLECT DIFFERENT 
VIEWS AND OPINIONS 
This section will analyze the sensitivity of the AHP model as it relates to changes 
in criterion and criterion weights in the previous example. To do this, changes will be 
made to the hypothetical AHP example from the previous sections. Since the analytical 
hierarchy process is designed to convert both subjective and objective criterion into a 
mathematical formula for use in making decisions between multiple alternatives, and the 
subjective and objective criterion may vary based on opinions of differing individuals, 
the following sections will explore how the AHP model changes due to variations in 
model parameters.   
 53 
For purposes of clarity, the AHP example discussed in next sections will be 
referred to as the “adjusted AHP example.” Table 23 is representative of the adjusted 
AHP example, and reflects the addition of three new criteria, “Leadership,” “Stress on 
Relationships,” and “Growth Potential,” and changes within the “Health Benefits” 
criterion in order to reflect proposed 2014 healthcare reforms. 
 
Table 23.   Adjusted AHP Chart Depicting New Criterion. 
Table 23 reflects a different opinion than the earlier hypothetical AHP example. 
The new opinions reflected in this adjusted AHP example will manifest themselves in the 
criterion weights and the resultant final decision. This adjusted AHP example intends to 
analyze the prospect that reasons for separating or remaining in the military change from 
individual to individual, and so subsequent retention efforts made by leadership within 
NSW may also need to adjust from individual to individual. This adjusted AHP example 
is intended to show the reader the versatility of the AHP model in identifying the 
importance of selected criterion even when they may vary from individual to individual 
or over time. 
G. EXPLANATION OF ALTERNATIVES AND ANY NEW CRITERIA FOR 
USE IN THE ADJUSTED AHP EXAMPLE 
The alternatives for the adjusted AHP example will remain the same as with the 
hypothetical AHP example, and attention will be focused on changes within the criterion. 
As shown in Table 23, the alternatives are: (1) remain in the military (2) take on a civilian 
job comparable to the 60–80th percentile of civilian wage earners, or (3) take on a 
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civilian job comparable to the 80–95th percentile of civilian wage earners. Table 23 also 
provides the outline for the new criterion used in this adjusted AHP example. For the 
objective and subjective criterion used in this adjusted AHP example, factors affecting 
the officer’s decision were broken down into eight criteria: (1) leadership (2) stress on 
relationships (combines deployments and training time away from home) (3) retirement 
benefits (4) health benefits (5) growth potential (6) job satisfaction (7) annual 
compensation, and (8) risk. Explanations of any new criteria used in this adjusted AHP 
example are summarized below.  
1. Leadership 
This criterion involves a person’s desire to work under a well-organized and 
forward-thinking person or body of decision makers. Participants from a recent survey 
ranked issues with upper leadership within NSW as their number one reason for 
separating from the community.66 It is for this reason “Leadership” will hold the greatest 
criterion weight in determining which alternative an individual should make. 
“Leadership” is a subjective criterion seeking to highlight the differences between good 
military leadership and perceived forward-thinking civilian leadership.  
NSW leadership will initially be viewed as reactive. This view manifests itself in 
a plan for regionalization made by NSW leadership in 2010.67 The plan, started in 2010, 
was executed in early 2012, and was reverted back to the original setup six months 
later.68 For this adjusted AHP model, leadership for the civilian 60–80th percentile will 
be perceived as organized, and leadership for the civilian 80–95th percentile will be 
perceived as forward thinking and organized. Therefore, when NSW leadership is  
 
                                                 
66 Nathan Scott, Naval Special Warfare Officer Retention Survey (Monterey, CA: NPS, September 
2013), IRB Protocol Number NPS.2013.0080-IR-EP7-A, Survey Question: Please elaborate your checked 
"Other" from above by typing any other criterion you feel were applicable to your decision to separate from 
active duty; please follow the scale system above for your new criterion (where 1 is least applicable, and 10 
is most applicable). 
67 Observations made in conjunction with a West Coast SEAL Team Operations Office, October 25, 
2013. 
68 Observations made in conjunction with a West Coast SEAL Team Operations Office, October 25, 
2013. 
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compared to the leadership for the civilian 60–80th percentile and civilian 80–95th 
percentile, it will receive a lower score than the civilian competitors within pair-wise 
comparisons.  
2.  Stress on Relationships 
This criterion represents the stress on the individual as a result of total time away 
from home. This criterion reflects both time away for deployments and time away for 
training for the SEAL officer, and it reflects time away for training for the civilian work 
life. For this adjusted AHP example, more time away from home was looked upon as 
worse than less time away from home. From Table 23, the 194 days/year listed for the 
“Remain in Military” alternative is representative of an average of values obtained from a 
recent survey sent to SEAL officers who opted to separate from the military.69 This 
survey also asked participants to list the number of days/year they currently spend away 
from home in their job as a civilian. Participants listed an average of 27 days/year of 
travel associated with their current civilian positions.70 Because this survey also found 
that the separated SEAL officer compensation average is most closely linked to that of 
the civilian 80–95th percentile ($173,22271 for separated SEAL officers compared to 
$178,02072 for the civilian 80–95th percentile), 27 days/year were used for the civilian 
80–95th percentile. For purposes of comparison between alternatives, time away from 
home for the civilian 60–80th percentile was less than 27 days/year. For this criterion, the  
 
 
                                                 
69 Nathan Scott, Naval Special Warfare Officer Retention Survey (Monterey, CA: NPS, September 
2013), IRB Protocol Number NPS.2013.0080-IR-EP7-A, Survey Question: How many days per year (on 
average) did you spend away from home (for training or deployment) while on active duty within Naval 
Special Warfare? 
70 Nathan Scott, Naval Special Warfare Officer Retention Survey (Monterey, CA: NPS, September 
2013), IRB Protocol Number NPS.2013.0080-IR-EP7-A, Survey Question: How much travel is associated 
with your current (or proposed) position? 
71 Nathan Scott, Naval Special Warfare Officer Retention Survey (Monterey, CA: NPS, September 
2013), IRB Protocol Number NPS.2013.0080-IR-EP7-A, Survey Question: What is your current (or 
anticipated new job) annual monetary compensation? 
72 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Table H-3. Mean Household Income Received by Each Fifth and 
Top 5 Percent,” U.S. Census Bureau, September 17, 2013, accessed September 14, 2013, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/index.html. 
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“Remain in Military” option will weight lower than both its civilian competitors, and the 
civilian 60–80th percentile will weight slightly higher than the civilian 80–95th percentile 
when conducing pair-wise comparisons.  
3. Health Benefits 
This criterion seeks to provide an objective comparison between health benefits 
for the SEAL officer compared to his civilian counterparts. For this adjusted AHP 
example, in order to show how a change in health care benefits may affect the example, 
health benefit costs for the civilian reflect proposed Affordable Care Act costs. This 
model still accepts that health benefits are taken care of for military persons (at no 
additional cost to the individual) remaining on active duty. For a person within the 
civilian 60–80th percentile or civilian 80–95th percentile income to receive the same 
level of health care as the SEAL officer, he must purchase the “Gold” plan at a national 
average cost of $12,700.73 For this criterion, the full-coverage health benefits (at zero 
additional cost) received for military service is seen as better than the full-coverage, 
$12,700 per year cost to a civilian. Affordable Care Act costs represent a marked 
improvement from the previous hypothetical AHP example (average $14,125 per year),74 
and value changes for this model will present themselves in the next section when a pair-
wise comparison is conducted. 
4. Growth Potential 
This criterion is another subjective criterion not initially included in the 
hypothetical AHP example calculations. It seeks to draw a comparison between SEAL 
officer promotion practices in which every SEAL officer generally promotes at the same 
time as every other officer of his year group within NSW. This military-style growth 
potential is viewed as worse than the perceived performance-based promotions and 
growth potential in the civilian sector.    
                                                 
73 The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, “Health Reform: Subsidy Calculator – Premium 
Assistance for Coverage in Exchanges,” Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013, accessed November 16, 2013, 
http://kff.org/interactive/subsidy-calculator/. 
74 Pat Kelley, “The Average Health Insurance Cost,” eHow.com, 2013, accessed November 16, 2013, 
http://www.ehow.com/about_7275823_average-health-insurance-cost.html. 
 57 
H. ADJUSTED CRITERION RANKING AND CRITERION WEIGHTS 
Table 24 depicts adjusted pair-wise comparisons for each criterion. Following the 
same process as the hypothetical AHP example, pair-wise comparisons are conducted in 






Table 24.   Adjusted AHP Example Pair-Wise Comparison of Criteria. 
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The pair-wise comparison from Table 24 results in the criterion weights found in 
Table 25. For this adjusted AHP example, changes within the “Leadership” criterion will 
have the largest impact on the final decision, whereas changes within the “Risk” criterion 
will have the smallest impact on the final decision. In other words, the “Leadership” 
value of 0.2987 shown in Table 25 is larger than all the other criterion weight values, and 
the “Risk” vector value of 0.0295 is smaller than all the other criterion weight values. 
 
Table 25.   Criterion Weights for the Adjusted AHP Example. 
Tables 26–33 represent the pair-wise comparisons for each alternative within each 
criterion. The pair-wise comparisons found in tables 26–33 are used for determining the 
eigenvector, and subsequently the final values for the alternatives.  
 
Table 26.   Alternatives Versus Leadership in Adjusted AHP Example. 
 
Table 27.   Alternatives Versus Stress on Relationships in Adjusted AHP Example. 
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Table 28.   Alternatives Versus Retirement Benefits in Adjusted AHP Example. 
 
Table 29.   Alternatives Versus Health Benefits in Adjusted AHP Example. 
 
Table 30.   Alternatives Versus Growth Potential in Adjusted AHP Example. 
 
Table 31.   Alternatives Versus Job Satisfaction in Adjusted AHP Example. 
 
Table 32.   Alternatives Versus Annual Compensation in Adjusted AHP Example. 
 
Table 33.   Alternatives Versus Risk in Adjusted AHP Example. 
The pair-wise comparison of each alternative as they relate to each other under 







Table 34.   Eigenvector Values for Adjusted AHP Example. 
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The criterion weights (Table 25) multiplied by each criterion’s respective 
eigenvector value results in the final values shown in Table 35: 
 
Table 35.   Final Values for Adjusted AHP Example. 
The “Remain in Military” value of 0.2797 is greater than the “Civilian 60–80th 
Percentile” value of 0.0.2131, but less than the “Civilian 80–95th Percentile” value of 
0.3984 (Table 35). This means that, for the SEAL officer whose opinions are represented 
within the adjusted AHP model, the SEAL officer will remain in the military if he thinks 
his best civilian alternative most closely relates to the “Civilian 60–80th Percentile,” and 
he will separate from the military if he thinks his civilian alternative is best representative 
of the “Civilian 80–95th Percentile.” 
In the earlier hypothetical AHP example, final value changes were most affected 
by making changes within the “Risk” and “Annual Compensation” criteria, the two most 
heavily weighted criteria for the model. Recall from earlier in this chapter that when 
“Risk” for military was improved, and “Annual Compensation” for the SEAL officer was 
increased to more closely match the “Civilian 80–95th Percentile,” the final for the 
“Remain in Military” alternative became larger than both of the other alternatives, and 
the best option for the SEAL officer was to remain in the military. 
With the adjusted AHP example, however, increasing the final value for the 
“Remain in Military” alternative is not best achieved by improvements within “Risk” and 
“Annual Compensation.” Recall from the hypothetical AHP example, that improving 
“Risk” and “Annual Compensation” did increase the “Remain in Military” final value. 
Instead, for the adjusted AHP example, we will see that improvements in these two 
criteria will have little effect on the final value because their criterion weight has been 
lessened. Table 36 has new values within the alternatives pair-wise comparison chart that 
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are representative of increased Military Annual Compensation as closer to that of the 
“Civilian 80–95th Percentile.” Table 37 has values within the alternatives pair-wise 
comparison chart that are representative of lowered military risk levels for the adjusted 
AHP example. These changes were made to the adjusted AHP example to show the 
ineffectiveness of improving the military annual compensation and decreasing military 
risk when these criteria have a low criterion weight. Table 38 reflects the new final values 
within the adjusted AHP example with changes to annual compensation and risk.  
 
Table 36.   Alternatives Versus Annual Compensation With Numerical Value Changes 
Reflecting Increased Military Annual Compensation Equal to that of the 
Civilian 80–95th Percentile in the Adjusted AHP Example. 
 
Table 37.   Alternatives Versus Risk With Numerical Value Changes Reflecting Lower 
Military Risk Levels in the Adjusted AHP Example. 
 
Table 38.   Final Values for Adjusted AHP Example With Increased Military Annual 
Compensation and Lower Military Risk Levels. 
For the adjusted AHP example, with new criterion weight values, improvements 
within the “Annual Compensation” and “Risk” criteria result in no change in the final 
decision for the individual. Namely, as indicated by Table 38, the SEAL officer will opt 
to remain in the military when comparing himself to the 60–80th Percentile, and he will 
separate when comparing himself to the Civilian 80–95th Percentile—the same 
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conclusions one would have made for the adjusted AHP example before improved 
military annual compensation and lowered military risk.  
However, for the adjusted AHP example, recall that the “Leadership” criterion 
had the highest criterion weight value, and so increased retention for this individual will 
come from improvements within NSW’s leadership. Table 39 contains the new values for 
the pair-wise comparison between alternatives as they relate to leadership. The numbers 
have been changed from their original adjusted AHP example values to reflect better 
NSW leadership when compared to the civilian sector and leadership that is perceived as 
proactive, forward thinking and organized. The final values that result from changes to 
improved NSW leadership for the adjusted AHP example may be seen in Table 40.  
Table 41 contains new values for the pair-wise comparison between alternatives that 
reflects NSW leadership as equal in quality to leadership in the civilian sector.  Table 42 
reflects final values with NSW leadership is equal in quality to the civilian sector. 
 
Table 39.   Alternatives Versus Leadership Within Adjusted AHP Example Depicting 
Military Leadership as Better Than Civilian Leadership. 
 
Table 40.   Final Values for Adjusted AHP Example After Improved Military 
Leadership. 
 
Table 41.   Alternatives Versus Leadership Within Adjusted AHP Example Depicting 
Military Leadership Equal in Quality to Civilian Leadership. 
 65 
 
Table 42.   Final Values for Adjusted AHP Example When Military Leadership is 
Equal in Quality to Civilian Leadership. 
Now, presuming improved NSW leadership is equal in quality or better than its 
perceived civilian competitors, the SEAL officer whose views most closely relate to 
those represented by the adjusted AHP example will opt to remain in the military over all 
other alternatives represented.   
I. INFLUENCING RETENTION BY IDENTIFYING LONG-TERM 
COMMUNITY ISSUES 
The Analytical Hierarchy Process, as it has been outlined by both the hypothetical 
and the adjusted AHP examples, can be a tool for identifying long-term community 
retention issues. Because the AHP model is a useful tool when making decisions 
involving multiple alternatives with multiple subjective or objective criteria, it can be 
used to identify those areas of concern for NSW that need improving, but that require 
systemic community changes to do so.  
As the examples outlined in the previous sections have demonstrated, influencing 
the final decision for the SEAL officer is achieved by making improvements within most 
heavily weighted criteria. Being able to identify the most heavily weighted criteria, then, 
becomes the next necessary concern for NSW. Some form of the survey outlined in 
Appendix D, administered to those officers opting to separate from NSW, would serve as 
a method for identifying the most important criteria for improving retention. Such a 
survey would ask the individual to make comparisons between his SEAL career and his 
perceived civilian work-life. 
Comparisons between the SEAL career and the perceived civilian work-life could 
then be converted into numerical values for use in the AHP model. Recall from our two 
previous AHP examples that the 9-point scale found in Appendix C is used for 
comparison of each criterion with one another in order to develop criterion weights, as 
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well as for comparison of each alternative as they compare to one another within each 
criterion in order to develop the eigenvector. Survey inputs, then, could be converted into 
the 9-point scale for use in the AHP model. For example, if criterion A received an 
average rating of “3” as its level of applicability for separating by all survey takers, and 
criterion B received an average rating of “9,” then criterion A is one third as important as 
criterion B when it comes to creating the criterion weights table. Converting to the 9-
point scale, criterion B would receive a “3” when compared to criterion A, and criterion 
A would receive a “1/3” when compared to criterion B. A similar process comparing 
each alternative to one another within each criterion can be done in order to determine the 
eigenvector. 
The survey could identify applicable criterion to the SEAL officer’s decision to 
retain or separate. Final values calculated from multiplication of the criterion weights 
matrix and the eigenvector would show the NSW community where the SEAL career 
stands in relation to civilian competitors. Criterion weights calculated from the survey 
would show NSW where should focus the majority of its retention efforts. Recall from 
the hypothetical and adjusted AHP examples, the difference in calculated criterion 
weights, shown again here in Tables 43 and 44. 
  
Table 43.   Criterion Weights for the Hypothetical AHP Example. 
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Table 44.   Criterion Weights for the Adjusted AHP Example. 
If NSW conducted a survey of its separating officers and calculated criterion 
weights similar to those shown in Table 43 it would know that improvements in “Risk” 
or “Annual Compensation” would hold the most relevance to improving retention for the 
hypothetical example because they have the highest criterion weights. “Leadership” or 
“Stress on Relationships” would hold the most relevance for improving retention for the 
adjusted AHP example in Table 44. Conversely, improvements within “Time Away: 
Training” in the hypothetical example would likely have little to no effect on the overall 
retention, and improvements within “Risk” would have little to no effect on retention in 
the adjusted AHP example. In other words, annual, individual surveys applied to AHP 
analysis could be used to better predict and affect retention within NSW. 
J. AHP CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter applied the analytical hierarchy process to NSW retention. We made 
changes within the alternatives pair-wise comparisons in order to show how 
improvements within a criterion affected the final values. The adjusted AHP example 
was used to show the versatility of the AHP model by making changes in criterion and 
analyzing their effect on the criterion weights and the overall final values for the AHP 
model. As it applies to NSW retention, findings suggest that the AHP model is a useful 
tool for identifying the most applicable criterion for use in influencing individual SEAL 
career decisions.  
Since criterion weights and pair-wise comparisons are subjective in nature, this 
chapter performed analysis of changes within the AHP model as it relates to changes with 
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the criterion weights and the pair-wise comparisons because the level of emphasis placed 
on one criterion for individual A may be different than the emphasis placed on the same 
criterion for individual B. As such, from an NSW community manger perspective, 
influencing retention or separation will likely require reshaping the AHP eigenvector by 
allocating resources into areas of concern that might be more readily influenced or by 
better managing assignments. The AHP model can identify these areas of concern by 
determining the most heavily weighted criteria. 
The Analytical Hierarchy Process is not a perfect solution for deciding between 
alternatives, but it does give one insight into how subjective criteria might be reshaped to 
influence objective decisions. As it pertains to NSW, the AHP model could be a viable 
tool for identifying the most applicable systemic, long-term, areas of concern for 
improving the community and subsequent officer retention. If applied to results from 
annual surveys, then the AHP could inform managers regarding decisions that could 
affect individual officer retention. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS: NEAR-TERM AND LONG-TERM 
RETENTION 
Naval Special Warfare has lost an average of more than 10% of its LCDR officer 
corps each year over the last four years (2010–2013).75 Leaders in NSW believe the 
community has a retention problem within its midlevel officer corps.76 As such, this 
thesis sought to provide the NSW community with both near-term and long-term 
solutions to the retention problem. Analysis concluded that the ACOL model was a viable 
tool for determining near-term, monetary retention solutions, and the AHP model was a 
viable too for use in determining long-term organizational retention solutions for NSW. 
For near-term solutions, or solutions that NSW might implement with immediate 
improvements in retaining its LCDRs, the ACOL model was used for conducting 
financial comparisons between the SEAL officer and his civilian counterparts. The 
ACOL examples found that the financial cost of leaving the military began to decrease 
after year nine. Under current conditions, the taste factor for a SEAL officer who is 
contemplating separation from NSW falls in the region that will opt to separate. The 
ACOL model also showed us that it was only after a CSRB of $25K was offered at YOS 
9 that the taste factor finally fell inside the region where the SEAL officer would opt to 
remain in the military. The ACOL chapter concluded by modeling the effects of a  
50% lump offering at YOS 10 of an eight year CSRB bonus contract. Structuring the 
CSRB bonus into this lump sum offering allowed for a shift in financial injection from 
YOS 9 to YOS 10, and placed the taste factor well within the region where the SEAL 
officer would opt to remain in the military. The ACOL model is a viable tool for 
determining near-term solutions to NSW’s retention problem. 
For long-term solutions, or solutions that might require more time and systemic 
organizational change, the AHP model presents a viable tool for use in determining 
                                                 
75 Jeromy Williams and Darin Evenson, “SEAL Officer (LCDR) Separations,” NSW Officer Detailing 
and Community Management Brief, February 2013. 
76 Observations made in conjunction with the office of the Naval Special Warfare Community 
Manager, October 25, 2013. 
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applicable areas of focus for the NSW community for improving retention. The AHP 
model identifies these areas of focus through the criterion weights. The most heavily 
weighted criterion will have the greatest effect on the final values for the alternatives. 
Conversely, the AHP model can also show NSW which criterion it should not put 
attention into by showing which criterion hold a low criterion weight value with little 
effectiveness in improving retention. If NSW implemented an annual survey in 
connection with the AHP model of an individual’s preferences regarding retention, then 
the AHP model might assist career managers by tailoring assignments to exploit 
individual retention preferences.   
The NSW community stands to improve the retention of its midlevel officers in 
both the near and long-term if it implements financial recommendations from the ACOL 
model, while simultaneously using the AHP model to maintain a pulse on community 






APPENDIX A. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES STAFFING 
 
 
Table 45.   Table Depicting Department of Defense Mandated Growth Percentages 
for the Navy.77 
                                                 
77 Department of Defense, The 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Washington, DC: 2012 (Table 3–3. Special 
Operations Forces Staffing, Chapter 3, page 42). 
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APPENDIX B. MILITARY COMPENSATION AMMOUNTS BY 
YEAR (YOS 1–13 EQUATES TO 2001–2013) 
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APPENDIX D. RECOMMENDED SURVEY QUESTIONS FOR 
IMPROVING NSW RETENTION 
1. Comparing your military career with your perceived civilian career, please list 
your top eight considerations for separating from military service (examples 
might include: retirement benefits, financial compensation, growth potential, 
leadership opportunity, work related risk, time away from home) 
2. For each of the eight considerations from above, please write what you believe its 
military equivalent to be. 
a. Example: financial compensation (military) = $128K gross per year 
b. Example: time away from home (military) = 90 days per year 
c. Example: work related risk (military) = HIGH 
3. For each of the eight considerations from above, please write what you perceive 
its civilian equivalent will be. 
a. Example: financial compensation (civilian) = $150K gross per year 
b. Example: time away from home (civilian) = 20 days per year 
c. Example: work related risk (civilian) = VERY LOW 
4. For each of the eight considerations, please rate, on a scale from 1–10 (where 1 is 
least applicable, and 10 is most applicable), the level of applicability that each 
consideration has on your decision to separate or remain on active duty service.  
a. Example: retirement benefits; level of applicability – 8 
b. Example: time away from home; level of applicability – 8 
c. Example: work related risk; level of applicability – 4 
d. Example: financial compensation; level of applicability – 3  
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